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Abstract—Efficient asset management is a key performance 
driver for asset-intensive organizations. Achieving high 
utilization and return on investment on physical assets are 
central corporate objectives for public and private 
organisations alike. Current approaches on asset management 
include the engineering and governance perspectives. The 
engineering perspective on asset management concentrates on 
the technical and operational dimensions of asset performance, 
including utilization, and operation to technical specifications. 
However, this perspective often ignores organisational-level 
factors that potentially affect asset performance. By contrast, 
from a governance perspective, key factors influencing asset 
management performance include stewardship, accountability 
and incentive regimes. Symmetrically, the governance view 
often takes the operational factors for granted. In sum, both 
perspectives offer valuable but incomplete insights on the 
management of asset performance: experience demonstrates 
that an exclusive focus on one or the other may lead to 
sub-optimal asset and organizational performance.  
In this paper, we investigate how an integrated approach to 
asset management can be constructed in the context of vehicle 
fleets. Vehicle fleets provide a suitable context to investigate 
these issues as they constitute significant investments, and are 
observable across a range of asset-intensive industries. 
Beginning with an analysis of how the asset management 
process is operated through the asset lifecycle, we identify key 
engineering and organizational factors influencing asset 
performance. The relationships between factors are analyzed to 
provide an integrated fleet asset management approach. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SSET-intensive organizations such as utilities, heavy 
engineering, mining, or transportation rely on assets 
that are expensive, extensive and/or complex, and have a 
major impact on organisational performance over extended 
periods [1], [2]. The efficient management of such assets is 
crucial to achieving high performance. From an operational 
perspective, high asset performance is obtained through the 
implementation of engineering asset management best 
practices [3], [4] However, engineering asset management 
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approaches often take for granted organisational-level 
influences encapsulated in asset governance principles [5]. 
This opens up the possibility that in a given organization, 
engineering asset management practices and asset 
governance policies may not be aligned, leading to 
sub-optimal asset performance. 
In this paper, we investigate the managerial and 
performance implications of asset governance policies in an 
asset-intensive organization, using the case of fleet vehicles 
in an Australian networked utility organization. Vehicle fleets 
provide a suitable context to investigate such issues as they 
constitute significant investments, and are observable across 
a range of asset-intensive industries.  
We begin with a comparison of the engineering and 
governance perspectives on asset management. We then 
analyse the fleet services unit of a large asset-intensive 
transport provider from an asset governance perspective to 
highlight the performance implications of governance 
arrangements. We conclude with a summary of findings and 
an agenda for future research. 
II. ENGINEERING AND GOVERNANCE PERSPECTIVES OF 
ASSET MANAGEMENT 
Across the disciplines involved in asset management, there 
is a broad consensus to recognise asset management as the 
process or cycle in which assets are “put through” in order to 
manufacture a product or provide a service at an optimum 
performance level [6]-[9]. The aim of engineering asset 
management is to integrate the strategic planning of 
operations, maintenance and capital investment 
decision-making. The overarching goal is to increase the 
efficiency of assets, which comprises enhancing asset 
productivity, maximizing asset value through the life-cycle, 
and minimizing the total cost of ownership [10].  
The engineering perspective to asset management can be 
considered from both temporal and physical dimensions. 
Typically, in this perspective, an engineered system is looked 
at through its whole lifecycle e.g. daily maintenance, weekly 
shutdowns, monthly larger shutdowns, and annual overhauls 
[11]. The engineering perspective to asset management 
focuses on dynamics such as technical wear, requirement 
specification and technological obsolescence.  By performing 
maintenance and modifications on the system an organization 
can intervene in the wear out process of the asset. 
Engineering asset management utilizes a Life Cycle Cost 
(LCC) calculations to assess the value of its physical asset, 
which includes costs such as research & development costs, 
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production & constructions costs, operation & maintenance 
costs, and retirement & disposal costs [5]. The maintenance 
process of a physical asset is a complex one, relying on 
feedback loops that are activated by failure reports, work 
requests, work orders and technical information that have to 
be processed smartly in order to update the maintenance 
program properly [12]  
The engineering view usually takes for granted that there is 
an organization that provides the infrastructure for skilled 
people to deliver services [13]. Whilst such an assumption is 
valid in the case of fully integrated organizations, it does not 
fully hold for many XXIst century organizations which have 
outsourced a range of activities to networks of providers [14]. 
This dis-integration of organizations has several management 
implications: the focus of management is broadened from 
organizational boundaries to network boundaries, and the 
role of the asset owner emphasizes contracting, supervision 
and asset strategy, i.e. strategic management instead of 
operational management. The evolution towards 
dis-integrated organization and network management implies 
that asset managers can no longer take governance for 
granted. 
Governance is defined as the laws, policies, and 
procedures that ensure organizations run in the interest of 
owners and resources are allocated, managed, and redeployed 
to maximize productivity and value [15]. Governance assists 
in determining appropriate management processes, 
organisational structures, and incentives systems to align 
managerial behaviour and attitudes with the interests of 
principals [16], and the relevant reporting and disclosures that 
enable proper transparency and accountability [17]. In this 
perspective, asset governance can be defined as a subset of 
organisational governance which specifies the policies and 
processes to acquire, utilise, maintain, and account for the 
assets of the organization [10]. It follows that asset 
governance can be viewed as a management approach for 
assets that takes into account asset ownership and the 
management of distributed systems in a competitive and 
deregulated market [18]-[22].  
By advocating transparent and accountable asset 
management policies, asset governance outlines aims to 
define principles to manage assets effectively  in distributed 
networks, a context where the development, stewardship and 
operation of assets may be open to competition [23]. Vehicle 
fleets provide a relevant context to investigate these issues as 
these assets involve substantial capital investments and may 
offer scope for externalization [24]. Clear definition and 
differentiation of roles and responsibilities of the asset owner, 
asset governor, and service providers for operational and 
maintenance activities are argued to be central to good asset 
governance [10]. Asset governance thus provides a 
framework to manage the separation of powers in asset 
management that characterises the management of networks 
[25], enabling effective asset management in a distributed 
system. Guidelines for the application of asset governance 
principles are outlined in industry standards such as the UK’s 
Publicly Available Specification for Asset Management 
(PAS 55) developed by the British Standards Institution 
[26]-[28]. PAS 55 was initiated in 2002 to provide a 
standardised framework for physical asset management 
systems. The PAS 55 defines physical asset management as a 
system that requires a life-cycle view and optimal mix of 
capital investments, operations, maintenance, resourcing, 
risks, performance, and sustainability. It has been 
recommended to industry regulators as a framework to audit 
governance [29]. Key asset governance principles embodied 
within PAS 55 include regulatory compliance, supply 
business satisfaction, risk-based, data supported, continuous 
improvement, pragmatic, and income maximisation and 
generation. 
A comparison of the literatures on engineering asset 
management and asset governance highlights areas of 
convergence and divergence. Proponents of both approaches 
advocate the implementation of systems that will maximise 
the performance or utilisation of assets while minimising risk 
factors. Both perspectives stress the importance of integrating 
strategic and operational decisions related to asset 
investments to ensure maximum return on investment. 
Minimising cost, or total asset life cycle cost, through careful 
acquisition, maintenance, and disposal policies are principles 
shared between engineering asset management and asset 
governance.  
However the focus of engineering asset management is 
different from that of asset governance, leading to significant 
differences between the two perspectives. Engineering asset 
management refers to the operational processes specifying 
how asset are managed in order to maximise operational 
performance: how they are acquired, maintained, and 
disposed of. Asset governance on the other hand concentrates 
on the organizational principles required to design and 
implement effective asset management policies in terms of 
transparency and accountability. Each approach therefore 
addresses a different dimension of asset management and 
performance. Because asset governance is derived from the 
overarching organizational governance principles of the 
organization as a whole, it defines the managerial context in 
which engineering asset management is implemented. Table I 
summarises the characteristics of the two approaches and 
highlights points of convergence and divergence. 
Asset governance principles are derived from two main 
theories of organization: agency theory and transaction cost 
economics (TCE). Agency theory is chiefly interested in the 
design of governance structures to mitigate the agency 
conflict arising from the possible divergence interests 
between shareholders (principals) and managers (agents) 
[16], [31]. Transaction cost economics is concerned with the 
governance of contractual relations in transactions between 
two parties [32]-[34]. 
 
 
 
TABLE I 
A COMPARISON BETWEEN ASSET MANAGEMENT AND ASSET 
GOVERNANCE 
 Engineering Asset 
Management 
Asset Governance 
Focus Engineering/Mechanic
al/ 
Operational 
Policy structuring, 
decision making process, 
align operations and 
business goals 
Compliance Technical 
specifications, health 
& safety standards 
Industry regulations/rules, 
international standards, 
benchmarks 
Separation of 
Power 
Asset Manager – day 
to day operational 
matters 
Asset Governor – long 
term strategic corporate 
goals 
Time Frame Long term – whole life 
cycle 
Short term – annual 
reporting 
Application Operational or 
divisional level 
Corporate core level 
Competitive 
process/edge 
Cutting edge 
specifications. 
Proactive maintenance 
and operational risk 
management 
Business level strategies: 
procurement processes & 
proactive risk management
Implementatio
n 
Technical and 
business capabilities 
Organizational change, 
local management 
personalities, 
organizational structure 
Planning Focus Operational and 
maintenance planning 
Corporate goals, decision 
making process  
Source: adapted from [5] and [30] 
Agency theory focuses on ways of controlling the 
self-serving behavior of agents to ensure that the interests of 
the principals are protected. Although agency theorists 
explain the agency problem in terms of the relationship 
between owners of a firm and the managers they hire to act on 
their behalf, the theory can be generalized to the relationship 
between lower levels of management [35], [36]. Thus agency 
theory is relevant to the analysis of relationships between 
levels in a hierarchy or chain of command. The notion of 
opportunism and self-interest is a dominant assumption in 
agency theory [37]-[39]. This behavioral feature, in the 
presence of uncertainty, leads to conflicts arising from a 
divergence of goals between parties [40]-[42]. Efficient 
governance is achieved through the design of appropriate 
incentive systems and governance mechanisms that work 
towards aligning the interests and behavior of agents in 
contexts of uncertainty so they act in the interest of principals. 
Efficient design is achieved when agency costs are minimized 
[43]. 
Transaction cost economics (TCE) is a theory of 
contractual relations that focuses on efficient drawing of 
organizational boundaries and contractual terms to manage 
transactions across organizational boundaries [24], [32], [34], 
[44].The aim of TCE is to minimize transaction costs between 
and within organizations. It argues that determining factors in 
drawing transaction-cost efficient organizations are the 
specificity of the assets involved, the frequency of transaction 
and the indeterminacy of transaction scope: high asset 
specificity, high transaction frequency, high indeterminacy 
all provide opportunities for opportunistic behavior and 
therefore call for integration of the assets in a single 
organization (Williamson, 1975). TCE thus provides a 
complementary perspective to agency theory as it takes into 
account the nature of the assets involved –a feature pertinent 
to asset management.  
Engineering asset management is concerned with the 
whole of life cycle cost of the assets, whereas the governance 
perspective will focus on monitoring performance in the 
context of a periodical reporting cycle. The two views have 
different, but complementary time horizons. The appropriate 
asset financing strategy must therefore balance the costs and 
benefits of whole-of-life engineering management and 
on-going governance. The specificity of the asset [33] is 
likely to be a determining factor in the choice of a financing 
structure that will ensure highest level of value extraction 
from its potential benefits [45]. In engineering asset 
management, an asset’s specificity is commonly dictated by 
technical specifications, and  in-house sourcing or dedicated 
contracting arrangements  increases with the complexity of 
the technical specification. [46] suggest that the higher the 
specificity of an asset the less chance of it being sourced 
externally as its availability in the general market would be 
low. Asset specificity would indicate that the assets are not 
likely to be as valuable when put to another use or in the 
hands of another user [47], [48], therefore the investment risk 
increases with the  specificity of assets (Williamson, 1975). 
Transaction intensity is another factor considered in 
organizing governance: the case for integrating transacting 
parties in the same organization increases with the frequency 
of transactions arising from the operation of an asset 
(Williamson, 1991). 
Fleets of road vehicles are a particularly relevant context in 
which to investigate the interplay between engineering asset 
management and asset governance. In most asset intensive 
organizations, vehicle fleets comprise a mix of assets with a 
range of investment values and specificity: from passenger 
cars to dedicated logistics and maintenance vehicles fitted 
with highly specific equipment. However, as the vehicles are 
used as part of the internal operations of the organization they 
will tend to exhibit relatively low and predictable transaction 
intensity as their operation is linked to that of the other assets 
of the organization: vehicle utilization and maintenance can 
be anticipated on the basis of planned operations and 
experienced patterns. Thus the determination of governance 
for vehicle fleets hinges mainly on the specificity of the asset. 
In the following section, we report the preliminary findings of 
a study conducted at the fleet services unit of a large 
asset-intensive transport provider, one of Australia’s largest 
railway operators. 
 
 
 
III. TRANSPORT PROVIDER – FLEET SERVICES 
The large asset-intensive transport provider in question is 
one of Australia’s largest passengers, coal and freight 
transport providers. As a publicly owned organization, this 
large asset-intensive transport provider is subject to the 
provisions of the Transport Infrastructure Act of 1994 and the 
Government Owned Corporations Act of 1993. Its 
shareholders are represented by two Ministers – the Minister 
of finance and the Minister for Transport and Main Roads 
[49]. This large asset-intensive transport provider is governed 
by a Governance Management Framework (GMF001) which 
reflects its status and ownership as a large government owned 
corporation. This set of guidelines sets out principles and 
structures to govern the corporation. It highlights the role of a 
range of functional and operational units and their 
relationships, introducing the role of ‘practice leaders’ as 
coordinators across a range of practices considered strategic 
for the appropriate operation of the organization, from 
financial reporting to health and safety. In an apparent 
paradox, there are no explicit guidelines nor practice leader 
for asset management.  
Interviews with senior managers revealed that this 
apparent omission was due to the assumption that operational 
managers were to implement autonomously asset 
management best practices in their business units. It was felt 
that the operational requirements of the business divisions 
–which range from the bulk transport of coal, to suburban 
passenger trains and interstate integrated freight- were so 
different that business units were better off implementing 
guidelines specific to their circumstances.  
This presents a particular challenge for the management of 
the fleet of road vehicles: this fleet is centrally managed from 
a dedicated unit, Fleet Services, which provides services to 
the other business units. Through Fleet Services business 
groups purchase or rent vehicles, and the management of each 
asset is governed by a specific contractual arrangement. Each 
contractual arrangement specifies the acquisition procedure 
of the vehicle (buy or rent), vehicle specifications, 
arrangement of finances, maintenance responsibilities, 
disposal schedule of the vehicle, and length of contract. Fleet 
Services transact with business units on a one-on-one basis, 
where each contractual arrangement is tailored to the needs of 
the business unit.  
In financial year 2004/2005 Fleet Services managed a fleet 
of 3323 items, of which 1996 were vehicles including 
passenger vehicles. light commercials, buses and trucks, and 
1327 were other registered items including trailers, forklifts 
and tractors. The percentage breakdown of the fleet was: 55% 
light commercial, 14% passenger, 7% road/rail vehicles, 23% 
trucks, 1% bus [50]. Of these, arguably only the road/rail 
vehicles and some of the utility vehicles and trucks were 
purchased to specifications unique to the asset-intensive 
transport provider, whilst the majority of the vehicles were 
standard issue and could be valuably used by other industrial 
operators or private users (86% of the fleet is used for freight 
operations).  The vehicle fleet thus comprises a mix of high 
specificity vehicles (e.g. road/rail vehicles for track 
maintenance) and low specificity vehicles (e.g. forklifts, 
passenger cars). Fleet Services therefore provides an ideal 
site to observe the interaction of engineering asset 
management and asset governance. Table II summarizes the 
principal characteristics of the management of road vehicle 
fleets by Fleet Services according to the key dimensions 
identified in the literature. 
TABLE II  
FLEET MANAGEMENT AT TRANSPORT PROVIDER-FLEET 
SERVICES UNIT 
 Engineering Asset 
Management 
(EAM) 
Asset Governance 
(AG) 
Comparison Notes 
Focus Fleet provision to 
business groups, 
maintenance issues, 
acquisition/disposal 
issues 
Contract with 
business groups, 
procurement and 
maintenance issues 
with external 
parties 
EAM focus between 
internal fleet and 
business group contracts 
only, AG focus on all 
internal/external 
contracts 
Complia
nce 
Technical 
specifications, 
health and safety 
standards 
Business group 
requirements, 
contract clauses 
(with business 
groups), financial 
reporting 
requirements 
EAM concentrate on 
technical specs, AG on 
organizational and 
reporting requirements 
Separati
on of 
Power 
Fleet Services 
general manager  
No asset governor 
or asset 
management 
practice leader 
Fleet Services general 
manager as both asset 
governor and asset 
manager – no separation 
of power 
Time 
Frame 
Contract based. 
Total lifecycle of 
asset 
Monthly, quarterly 
and annual 
reporting 
EAM has a long-term 
focus, AG short-term 
focus 
Applicat
ion 
Dedicated central 
department (Fleet 
Services)  
Ad-hoc multiple 
arrangements 
including 
decentralized 
management in 
business units 
EAM: dedicated 
department – thus “in 
order”, a strength. 
AG: ad-hoc arrangements 
– thus needs further 
development, still a 
weakness 
Competi
tive 
process/
edge 
Service provision to 
business groups, 
fulfillment of 
technical 
specifications 
Individual / tailored 
contract with 
business groups 
- 
Impleme
n- 
tation 
Technical 
specification and 
maintenance 
support, acquisition 
and disposal 
support 
Dedicated 
organizational 
structure (1 fleet 
services person per 
business contract), 
consumer-specific 
contractual 
arrangements 
EAM: concentrated on 
maximizing asset life 
cycle 
AG: concentrate on the 
relationships and 
structure surrounding 
maximizing the asset life 
cycle 
Planning 
Focus 
Maintenance, 
acquisition and 
disposal, total 
life-cycle of asset 
Driven by corporate 
reporting cycle 
EAM: based on total life 
cycle of the asset 
AG: based on corporate 
reporting cycle 
Source: Interviews and document analysis 
The implementation of asset management at Fleet Services 
is driven by two sets of factors: on the one hand, engineering 
and technical specifications are given by experts from other 
units (technical specifications from the business units and 
 
 
 
health and safety specifications from practice leader), but on 
the other hand each asset is governed by a specific contract, 
leading to a multiplicity of arrangements depending on the 
preferences of the client business unit. This arrangement thus 
maximizes the responsiveness of Fleet Services to the needs 
of its client business units. But this situation has been 
identified as a major challenge by Fleet Services: whilst the 
flexibility required to address the need of the business units is 
acknowledged, it increases the complexity of the 
management of the vehicle fleets, opening up the possibility 
that the same model of vehicle be governed by different 
contractual and operational arrangements depending on the 
client business unit. This indicates that the operational 
business units of the asset-intensive transport provider appear 
to have implemented slightly different asset management 
practices, thus defeating the benefits of operating a 
centralized management service. 
Interviews with business unit managers reveal a range of 
understandings of the purposes and principles of asset 
management, each emphasizing a different aspect relevant to 
their local and immediate concerns. The business unit acting 
as practice leader for health and safety, for instance, 
emphasized those aspects in its understanding of asset 
management, at the expense of other technical, 
organizational, or business considerations. Business units 
generally emphasized their need for autonomy in governing 
their assets according to their business requirements, whilst 
acknowledging the need for increased consistency and 
transparency in decision making and financial reporting in 
relation to assets. Fleet Services highlighted the need to 
implement consistent processes with regards to acquisition 
decisions, contractual arrangements, and maintenance and 
disposal policies. When questioned about initiatives to reduce 
the complexity of fleet management and improve the 
performance of Fleet Services, interviewees explained that 
considerable efforts had been made to reduce the diversity of 
vehicle models in the fleet, eliminating costly small variations 
that were not necessary in practice: in recent years the range 
of types and models of vehicles business units could choose 
from had been reduced and this had led to improved 
purchasing terms due to bulk purchases. In total, the analysis 
of the practices of vehicle fleet management at the large 
asset-intensive transport provider revealed an operation 
dominated by technical and health and safety specifications 
tailored to the needs of individual business units, with only a 
limited commonality of practices in terms of asset 
governance, which made the central management of vehicle 
fleets relatively complex –and presumably costly. 
The analysis highlights that whilst the business units in the 
case had paid attention to governance in terms of reporting 
and transparency, the quest for operational autonomy of the 
business units had led to adopt localized decision making 
criteria, and increased complexity of governance 
arrangements for the centralized management of the vehicle 
fleet. Incorporating asset specificity criteria in the decision 
making process offers an opportunity to reduce this 
complexity: transaction costs economics suggests that a 
uniform, standardized and centralized governance structure 
would be appropriate for all vehicles that exhibit low asset 
specificity, leading to one set of arrangements for these. By 
contrast, vehicles acquired to technical specifications unique 
to the client business units should be governed by specially 
tailored governance arrangements. Reorganizing the 
governance of vehicle fleets in this way should enable Fleet 
Services to reallocate some of its resources –reducing the 
managerial attention directed at non-specific assets- leading 
to increased productivity and/or higher levels of performance 
and service. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have argued that asset performance is not 
purely determined by engineering asset management 
principles, policies and practices: governance issues also 
matter. The implementation of appropriately designed 
governance principles, policies and practices has a material 
impact on the total organizational performance as governance 
is a key driver of administrative cost. The case study of Fleet 
Services at a large asset-intensive transport provider 
illustrates that paying insufficient attention to economic 
governance factors such as asset specificity may lead to 
increased organizational complexity and costs, resulting in 
below-potential performance. 
This case study suggests that further research should be 
conducted on the asset performance implications of the 
governance arrangements implemented in asset-intensive 
organizations. 
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